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ABSTRACT
SDN promises to make networks more flexible, pro-
grammable, and easier to manage. Inherent security
problems in SDN today, however, pose a threat to the
promised benefits. First, the network operator lacks
tools to proactively ensure that policies will be followed
or to reactively inspect the behavior of the network.
Second, the distributed nature of state updates at the
data plane leads to inconsistent network behavior dur-
ing reconfigurations. Third, the large flow space makes
the data plane susceptible to state exhaustion attacks.
This paper presents SDNsec, an SDN security ex-
tension that provides forwarding accountability for the
SDN data plane. Forwarding rules are encoded in the
packet, ensuring consistent network behavior during re-
configurations and limiting state exhaustion attacks due
to table lookups. Symmetric-key cryptography is used
to protect the integrity of the forwarding rules and en-
force them at each switch. A complementary path val-
idation mechanism allows the controller to reactively
examine the actual path taken by the packets. Fur-
thermore, we present mechanisms for secure link-failure
recovery and multicast/broadcast forwarding.
1. INTRODUCTION
Software Defined Networking (SDN) and its current
realization – OpenFlow [1] – promise to revolutionize
networking by centralizing network administration and
eliminating vendor lock-in. Rapid service deployment,
simplified networkmanagement, and reduced operational
costs are some of the promised benefits. Furthermore,
SDN serves as a building block to mitigate network se-
curity issues [2, 3, 4]. Ironically, though, security of
SDN itself is a neglected issue.
SDN is rife with vulnerabilities at the data plane.
Compromised switches [5, 6, 7] can redirect traffic over
unauthorized paths to perform eavesdropping, man-in-
the-middle attacks, or to bypass security middleboxes [8].
Furthermore, they can disrupt availability by launching
state exhaustion attacks against other switches [8, 9, 10]
or by simply dropping packets. In addition, next gen-
eration botnets, consisting of compromised hosts and
switches, could unleash an unprecedented firepower against
their victims. There are latent vulnerabilities in SDN
today that make these attacks feasible.
The first problem lies in the adversary model for the
data plane: all network devices are trusted to correctly
follow the specified network policies. Thus, the data
plane lacks accountability mechanisms to verify that
forwarding rules are correctly applied. Specifically, it
does not provide guarantees that the policies will be
followed (enforcement) nor proof that policies have not
been violated (validation). Once one or more switches
get compromised, forwarding policies can be violated
without getting caught by other switches or the con-
troller.
Another problem is the lack of consistency guarantees
when the forwarding plane is reconfigured [11]. During
reconfigurations, packets can follow paths that do not
comply with policy, leading to link flooding or isola-
tion violations in multitenant environments. This is an
inherent problem in distributed systems, because the
new policy is correctly applied only after all affected
switches have been updated. However, an attacker can
exploit the problem by forcing reconfigurations through
a compromised switch.
Our goal is to build an SDN security extension which
ensures that the operator’s policies are correctly ap-
plied at the data plane through forwarding accountabil-
ity mechanisms. That is, the extension should ensure
consistent policy updates, enforce network paths, and
provide a means for operators to reactively inspect how
traffic has been forwarded.
There are only a few proposals dealing with SDN
data-plane security. A recent security analysis of Open-
Flow [9] proposes simple patch solutions (rate limiting,
event filtering, and packet dropping) to counter resource
exhaustion attacks. SANE [12], a pre-SDN era pro-
posal, proposes a security architecture to protect en-
terprise networks from malicious switches. However,
it lacks a validation mechanism to ensure that a path
was indeed followed; failure recovery is pushed to the
end hosts. Another class of proposals checks for pol-
icy violations by examining certain network invariants;
checking can be performed in real time during network
reconfigurations [3, 13, 14] or by explicitly requesting
the state of the data plane [15].
Contributions. This paper proposes an SDN security
extension, SDNsec, to achieve forwarding accountabil-
ity for the SDN data plane. Consistent updates, path
enforcement, and path validation are achieved through
additional information carried in the packets. Crypto-
graphic markings computed by the controller and veri-
fied by the switches construct a path enforcement mech-
anism; and cryptographic markings computed by the
switches and verified by the controller construct a path
validation mechanism. Furthermore, we describe mech-
anisms for secure failure recovery. Finally, we imple-
ment the SDNsec data plane on software switches and
show that state exhaustion attacks are confined to the
edge of the network.
2. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
We consider a typical SDN network with a forwarding
plane that implements the operator’s network policies
through a logically centralized controller. Network poli-
cies of the operator dictate which flows are authorized
to access the network and which paths are authorized
to forward traffic for the corresponding flows.
Our goal is to design an extension that makes a best-
effort attempt to enforce network policies at the for-
warding plane, and to detect and inform the controller
in case of policy violations.
2.1 Adversary Model
The goal of the attacker is to subvert the network
policies of the operator (e.g., by forwarding traffic over
unauthorized paths) or to disrupt the communication
between end hosts. To this end, we consider the follow-
ing attacks:
Path deviation. A switch causes packets of a flow to
be forwarded over a path that has not been authorized
for the specific flow. This attack can take the following
forms (Figure 1):
• Path detour. A switch redirects a packet to devi-
ate from the original path, but later the packet re-
turns to the correct next-hop downstream switch.
• Path forging. A switch redirects a packet to de-
viate from the original path, but the packet does
not return to a downstream switch of the original
path.
• Path shortcut. A switch redirects a packet and
skips other switches on the path; the packet is for-
warded only by a subset of the intended switches.
Packet replay. A switch replays packet(s) to flood a
host or another switch.
Denial-of-Service. We consider state exhaustion at-
tacks against switches, which disrupt communication of
end hosts.
S
D
Authorized path
Path shortcut
Path detour
Path forging
Figure 1: Forms of path deviation attacks that do not
follow the authorized path from S to D.
We consider an adversary that can compromise in-
frastructure components and hosts, and can exploit pro-
tocol vulnerabilities. Furthermore, compromised com-
ponents are allowed to collude.
We do not consider payload modification attempts
by switches, as hosts do not trust the network and use
end-to-end integrity checks to detect any unauthorized
changes. In addition, controller security is out of the
scope of this paper, since our goal is to enforce the con-
troller policies at the forwarding plane.
2.2 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions:
• Cryptographic primitives are secure, i.e., hash func-
tions cannot be inverted, signatures cannot be forged,
and encryptions cannot be broken.
• The communication channel between the controller
and benign switches is secure (e.g., TLS can be
used, as in OpenFlow [1]).
• End hosts are authenticated to the controller and
cannot spoof their identity (e.g., port-based Net-
work Access Control can be used [16]).
3. OVERVIEW
In SDNsec, the controller computes network paths
and the corresponding forwarding information. The
switches at the edge of the network receive this for-
warding information over a secure channel and embed
it into packets that enter the network. Switches at the
core of the network forward packets according to the for-
warding information carried in the packets; and the last
switch on the path removes the embedded information
before forwarding the packet to the destination. Fig-
ure 2 shows the network model for SDNsec. We stress
that end hosts do not perform any additional function-
ality (e.g., communicate with the controller), i.e., the
network stack of the hosts is unmodified.
We describe and justify our main design decisions and
present an overview of the control and data plane.
3.1 Central Ideas
We identify three main problems that undermine net-
work policies in today’s SDN networks and describe our
corresponding design decisions.
Consistent Updates. In SDN, the distributed nature
of updating the forwarding plane can cause inconsis-
tencies among switches. Specifically, a new policy is
correctly applied only after all affected switches have
been reconfigured; however, during state changes the
forwarding behavior may be ill-defined. Although solu-
tions have been proposed to counter this problem [17,
18], they require coordination between the controller
and all the involved switches in order to perform the
updates.
In SDNsec, packets encode the forwarding informa-
tion for the intended path. This approach guarantees
that once a packet enters the network, the path to be
followed is fixed and cannot change under normal opera-
tion (i.e., without link failures). Hence, a packet cannot
encounter a mixture of old and new forwarding policies,
leading to inconsistent network behavior. Forwarding
tables exist only at the entry and exit points of the
network, simplifying network reconfiguration: only the
edge of the network must be updated and coordination
among all forwarding devices is not needed.
The packet overhead we have to pay for this approach
provides additional benefits: guaranteed loop freedom,
since we eliminate asynchronous updates; and minimum
state requirements for switches, since forwarding tables
are not needed in most of the switches (see Section 3.3).
The lack of forwarding tables confines the threat of state
exhaustion attacks.
Path Enforcement. In SDN, the controller cannot
obtain guarantees that the forwarding policies will be
followed, since the forwarding plane lacks enforcement
mechanisms. Ideally, when a switch forwards packets
out of the wrong port, the next-hop switch detects the
violation and drops the packet.
We incorporate a security mechanism that protects
the integrity of the forwarding information in order to
detect deviations from the intended path and drop the
traffic. However, this mechanism by itself is insufficient
to protect from replaying forwarding information that
has been authorized for other flows.
Path Validation. In SDN, the controller has no knowl-
edge of the actual path that a packet has taken due to
the lack of path validation mechanisms.
We design a reactive security mechanism that checks
if the intended path was followed. The combination of
path enforcement and path validation provides protec-
tion against strong colluding adversaries.
3.2 Controller
The controller consists of two main components: a
path computation component (PCC) and a path vali-
dation component (PVC). Furthermore, the controller
generates and shares a secret key with every switch at
the data plane; the shared key is communicated over
the secure communication channel between them.
3.2.1 Path Computation Component
...S0 S1 SnSi ...
K0
K1 Ki
Kn
Controller
Figure 2: The SDNsec network model: The ingress and
egress switches store forwarding tables; and the con-
troller has a shared secret with every switch at the data
plane.
The PCC computes the forwarding information for
paths that are authorized for communication. Specif-
ically, for each flow that is generated, a path is com-
puted. We do not impose restrictions on the flow spec-
ification; for interoperability with existing deployments,
we adopt the 13-tuple flow specification of OpenFlow [19].
The computed forwarding information for a flow is
embedded in every packet of the flow. For each switch
on the path, the PCC calculates the egress interface
that the packet should be forwarded on1. Hence, the
ordered list of interfaces specifies the end-to-end path
that the packets should follow. Furthermore, each flow
and its corresponding path is associated with an expi-
ration time (ExpTime) and a flow identifier (FlowID).
The expiration time denotes the time at which the flow
becomes invalid, and the flow identifier is used to opti-
mize flow monitoring in the network (Section 4.4).
Furthermore, the forwarding information contains cryp-
tographic primitives that realize path enforcement. Each
forwarding entry (FE (Si)) for switch Si contains a Mes-
sage Authentication Code (MAC) that is computed over
the egress interface of the switch (egr(Si)), the flow in-
formation (ExpTime and FlowID), and the forwarding
entry of the previous switch (FE(Si−1)); the MAC is
computed with the shared key (Ki) between the con-
troller and the corresponding switch on the path. Equa-
tion ?? and Figure 2 illustrate how the forwarding in-
formation is computed recursively for switch Si (for
1 ≤ i ≤ n).
B = FlowID || ExpTime
FE (Si) = egr(Si) || MAC (Si)
MAC (Si) = MACKi(egr(Si) || FE (Si−1) || B)
(1)
Furthermore, a forwarding entry for switch S0 is in-
serted into the packet to be used by S1 for correct verifi-
cation of its own forwarding information; FE (S0) is not
used by the first-hop switch and is computed as follows:
FE (S0) = B.
3.2.2 Path Validation Component
1We assume a unique numbering assignment for the
ports of a switch.
The PVC is a reactive security mechanism that pro-
vides feedback/information about the path that a packet
has taken. The controller can then detect attacks that
have bypassed path enforcement and reconfigure the
network accordingly. Path validation is achieved through
two mechanisms: a path validation field in the packet
and flow monitoring.
Each switch embeds a proof in every packet that it
has indeed forwarded the packet. Hence, the collec-
tive proof from all on-path switches forms a trace for
the path that the packet has taken. The controller can
instruct any switch to report packet headers and thus
inspect the path that was taken.
The path validation field of a switch (PVF (Si)) con-
tains a MAC that is computed over the PVF of the
previous switch (PVF (Si−1)), flow related information
(FlowID), and a sequence number (SeqNo). The SeqNo
is used to construct mutable information per packet,
ensuring different PVF values for different packets; this
detects replay attacks of the PVFs. The MAC is com-
puted with the shared key between the switch and the
controller2. Equation ?? shows how the PVF is com-
puted:
C = FlowID || SeqNo
PVF (S0) = MACK0(C)
PVF (Si) = MACKi(PVF (Si−1) || C), 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(2)
Given the FlowID and PVF in the packet header, the
controller can detect path deviations. The controller
knows the path for the given flow, and thus the keys
of the switches on the path. Thus, the controller can
recompute the correct value for the PVF and compare it
with the reported one. However, this mechanism cannot
detect dishonest switches that do not report all packet
headers when requested.
Monitoring and flow statistics are additional mecha-
nisms to detect false reporting.3 The controller can in-
struct arbitrary switches to monitor specific flows and
obtain their packet counters. Inconsistent packet re-
ports indicate potential misbehavior and further inves-
tigation is required. For instance, if all switches after a
certain point on the path report a lower packet count,
then packets were possibly dropped. However, if only a
switch in the middle of the path reports fewer packets,
it indicates a dishonest report. The controller combines
flow monitoring with the PVF in the packet headers to
detect policy violations.
3.3 Data Plane
The data plane of SDNsec consists of edge and core
2For ease of exposition, the MAC of the PVF is com-
puted with the same key as the MAC of the FE. In a
real deployment, these two keys would be different.
3Monitoring is an essential tool for other crucial tasks
as well (e.g., traffic engineering).
switches (Figure 2). Edge switches (shaded circles) op-
erate at the edge of the network and serve as the entry
and exit points to the network. Core switches operate
in the middle of the network and forward packets based
on the forwarding information in the packets.
3.3.1 Edge Switches
Edge switches are directly connected to network hosts
and perform different operations when acting as an en-
try point (ingress switch) and when acting as an exit
point (egress switch). Edge switches, as opposed to core
switches, have flow tables in order to forward packets.
Ingress Switch. An ingress switch receives packets
from source hosts and uses a forwarding table to look up
the list of forwarding entries for a specific flow. In case
of a lookup failure, the switch consults the controller
and obtains the corresponding forwarding information.
Next, the switch creates a packet header and inscribes
the forwarding information in it. Furthermore, for ev-
ery packet of a flow, the switch inscribes a sequence
number to enable replay detection of the PVF. Finally,
the switch inscribes PVF (S0 ), and forwards the packet
to the next switch.
Egress Switch. An egress switch receives packets from
a core switch and forwards them to the destination. To
forward a packet, the egress switch uses a forwarding
table in the same way as the ingress switch.
Having a forwarding table at the egress switch is a
design decision that limits the size of forwarding tables
at ingress switches. It allows rule aggregation at ingress
switches at the granularity of an egress switch. With-
out a forwarding table at the egress switch, a separate
flow rule for every egress port of an egress switch would
be needed. The egress switch has the egress interface
encoded in its FE, but it does not consider it when for-
warding the packet; the FE is still used to verify the
correct operation of the previous hop.
Upon packet reception, the switch removes the ad-
ditional packet header and forwards the packet to the
destination. If requested, it reports the packet header,
together with its PVF to the controller.
3.3.2 Core Switches
Core switches operate in the middle of the network
and perform minimal operations per packet. They ver-
ify the integrity of their corresponding forwarding entry
and forward the packet out of the specified interface. In
case of a verification failure, they drop the packet and
notify the controller.
Furthermore, each core switch stores a list of failover
paths that are used in case of a link failure (Section 4.2)
and keeps state only for multicast/broadcast traffic (Sec-
tion 4.3) and flow monitoring (Section 4.4).
4. DETAILS
First, we present the SDNsec packet header. Then,
we describe link-failure recovery, multicast/broadcast
forwarding, and monitoring.
4.1 SDNsec Packet Header
The packet header (Figure 3) encodes the forward-
ing information (Equation ??), the PVF (Equation ??),
and additional information that enables the switches to
parse the header (e.g., a pointer to the correct forward-
ing entry). We present the packet-header fields catego-
rized by their use.
4.1.1 Fields for Forwarding and Path Enforce-
ment
• Packet Type(PktType): PktType indicates whether
the packet is a multicast/broadcast or a unicast
packet. A single bit is used as a boolean flag to
indicate the packet type.
• FE Ptr: A pointer that points to the FE that a
switch on the path must examine. During packet
processing, each switch increments the pointer so
that the next-hop switch examines the correct FE.
One byte is allocated for the FE Ptr, which means
that SDNsec can support up to 255 switches for a
single path. This upper bound does not raise prac-
tical considerations even for large topologies, since
the network diameter is typically much shorter.
• Expiration Time (ExpTime): ExpTime indi-
cates the time after which the flow becomes in-
valid. Switches discard packets with expired for-
warding information. ExpTime is expressed at the
granularity of one second, and the four bytes can
express up to 136 years.
• Forwarding Entry (FE): A FE for switch Si
consists of the egress interface of switch Si (egr(Si))
and the MAC (MAC(Si)) that protects the in-
tegrity of the partial path that leads up to the
switch Si. One byte is used for egr(Si) allowing
each switch to have up to 255 interfaces; and 7
bytes are used for MAC(Si). In Section 5.1, we
justify why a 7-byte MAC is sufficient to ensure
path integrity.
4.1.2 Fields for Path Validation
• Path Validation Field (PVF): Each switch that
forwards the packet inserts a cryptographic mark-
ing on the PVF according to Equation ??, and
the controller uses the PVF for path validation.
SDNsec reserves 8 bytes for PVF, and in Section 5.1,
we justify that 8 bytes provide sufficient protection
against attacks.
• Sequence Number (SeqNo): The ingress switch
inserts a monotonically increasing packet counter
in every packet it forwards. Specifically, a separate
counter is kept for every flow entry at the ingress
switch. The SeqNo is used to randomize the PVF
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Figure 3: SDNsec packet header for unicast traffic.
and to detect replay attacks against the Path Val-
idation mechanism, in which a malicious switch
replays valid PVFs to validate a rogue path. The
24-bit sequence number can identify more than 16
million unique packets for a given flow. For the av-
erage packet size of 850 bytes in data centers [20],
the 24 bits suffice for a flow size of 13 GB; Benson
et al. report that the maximum flow size is less
than 100 MB for the 10 data centers studied [21].
Hence, it is highly unlikely that the sequence num-
ber wraps around. Even if the sequence number
wraps around, under normal operation the same
values would appear a few times, whereas in an
attack scenario typically a high repetition rate of
certain values would be observed.
• Flow ID (FlowID): FlowID is an integer that
uniquely identifies a flow. FlowIDs are used to
index flow information, enabling SDNsec entities
(controller and switches) to efficiently search for
flow information; the 3 bytes can index over 16
million flows. The active flows in four data centers,
as observed from 7 switches in the network, do not
exceed 100,000 [21].
4.1.3 Fields for Link-Failure Recovery
• Link Failure Counter (LFC): LFC indicates
the number of failed links that a packet has en-
countered throughout its journey towards the des-
tination. SDNsec reserves 6 bits for LFC, which
means that up to 63 link failures can be supported
(see Section 4.2).
• Egress Switch ID (EgressID): The EgressID
identifies the egress switch of a packet. Although
FEs in the packet dictate the sequence of switches
that a packet traverses, the core switches on the
path cannot determine the egress switch (except
for the penultimate core switch) from the FEs.
However, the egress switch information is neces-
sary when a core switch suffers a link failure and
needs to determine an alternate path to the egress
switch. To this end, the SDNsec header contains
the EgressID.With 2 bytes, it is possible to uniquely
identify 65,536 switches, which is sufficient even for
large data centers.
4.2 Link-Failure Recovery
The design decision that packets encode the forward-
ing information for the intended path makes link-failure
recovery challenging: the intended path for packets that
are already in the network is no longer valid. Dropping
all ill-fated packets does not compromise the security
guarantees, but degrades network availability until the
controller reconfigures the network.
We design a temporary solution to account for the
ill-fated packets until a new path is specified at the cor-
responding ingress switches or until the failure is fixed.
Furthermore, the temporary solution must satisfy the
three requirements for SDNsec. First, it must ensure
update consistency, i.e., only one temporary policy must
be used on one packet for one link failure. Second, it
must provide path enforcement, i.e., deviations from the
intended temporary path should lead to packet drop-
ping from a benign switch. Third, it must enable path
validation, i.e., the controller must be able to verify the
path – including the switches of the temporary policy –
that a packet has taken.
Our recoverymechanism uses a failover path. A failover
path is a temporary path that detours around the failed
link and leads to the same egress switch as the orig-
inal path. The forwarding information of the failover
path is encoded in the packet as described in Equa-
tion ??. That is, the failover path contains the list of
egress interfaces of the switches that are on the detour
path; the integrity of the list is protected with MACs
that are computed with the corresponding keys of these
switches. When a link failure is detected, the switch
inserts the appropriate pre-computed failover path into
the packet and forwards the packet to the appropriate
next hop, as specified by the failover path. Each switch
on the failover path updates the PVF as it would do for
a normal path. Since the failover path is constructed
identically to the original path, the forwarding proce-
dure (Section 3.3) needs only minor modifications (Sec-
tion 4.2.1).
This solution satisfies the mentioned requirements.
First, update consistency is satisfied since the forward-
ing information of the failover path is encoded in the
SDNsec header. Second, the authenticated forward-
ing information provides path enforcement. Third, the
controller can perform path validation – including the
failover path – with minor changes.
One shortcoming of the recovery mechanism is the
requirement to store state at core switches for the pre-
computed failover paths. To balance the tradeoff be-
tween fine-grained control and state requirements, core
switches store per-egress-switch failover paths. Alter-
native solutions could store per-flow or per-link failover
FlowID EgressID SeqNo
ExpTime
FE
Ptr
A series of Original
Forwarding Entries (FEs)
PVF
FlowID EgressID SeqNo
ExpTime
FE
Ptr
LFC
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A series of Forwarding Entries (FEs)
for the Failover Path
PVF
FailOverPathID Unused SeqNo
LFC
(=0)
Figure 4: Modifications to the SDNsec packet header
for link-failure recovery; additional and modified fields
are highlighted.
paths. Per flow failover paths provide very fine-grained
control, since the operator can exactly specify the path
for a flow in case of a failure. However, core switches
would have to store failover paths for every flow they
serve. Per-link failover paths minimize the state re-
quirements, but provide minimal control to the opera-
tor4. Furthermore, a path to the egress switch might
exist, even if a path around the failed link to the next-
hop switch does not.
Storing per-egress-switch failover paths may not sat-
isfy the strict isolation requirements for certain flows.
For example, the failover path to the egress switch may
traverse an area of the network that should be avoided
for specific flows. To this end, we define a do not detour
flag. If set, the switch drops the packet instead of us-
ing the failover path. In other words, the flag indicates
if security or availability prevails in the face of a link
failure. Note that failover paths are temporary fixes
to increase availability, while the controller computes a
permanent solution to respond to the failure.
4.2.1 Forwarding with Failover Paths
Packet Header. Figure 4 shows how a switch changes
the packet header of an ill-fated packet when a failover
path is used. The FEs of the original path are replaced
with those of the failover path. Furthermore, the switch
changes the expiration time field with ExpT imeFailoverPath
and appends the information of the failover path (i.e.,
FailoverPathID, SeqNo) below that of the original
path. Hence, the packet contains the flow information
of the original and the failover paths followed by the
FEs of the failover path.
Then, the switch resets FE Ptr to one so that the
next-hop switch on the failover path can correctly de-
termine the FE that it needs to examine.
Lastly, the switch increments the LFC by one to in-
dicate that a link-failure has occurred. The LFC field
counts the number of failover paths that a packet has
taken and enables multiple link failures to be handled
without additional complexity.
Forwarding Procedure. Three changes are made
to the forwarding procedure to accommodate link fail-
4 Per-link failover paths would detour the ill-fated pack-
ets to the next-hop switch of the original path, but over
another temporary path.
ures. First, since additional forwarding information is
inserted into the packet if there is a detour, a switch
identifies the correct FE by computing the following
byte offset from the beginning of the SDNsec packet
header: 6 + (LFC + 2) ∗ 8 + FEPtr ∗ 8 bytes. Second,
when computing the PVF, the switch uses Equation ??
if there is a detour. FailOverPathID is determined by
looking at the FlowID field of the most recent forward-
ing information, which is identified by taking the byte
offset of 6 + LFC ∗ 8 bytes.
C = FailOverPathID || SeqNo (3)
4.2.2 Path Validation
Path validation accounts for the switches on the orig-
inal path and the failover path. The controller obtains
the switches of the path that the packet should have
traversed by referring to the FlowID field(s) of the for-
warding information in the header. Then using Equa-
tion ?? for the original path and Equation ?? for the
failover path(s), the controller computes the expected
PVF value and compares it with the PVF value in the
packet header.
4.3 Multicast/Broadcast
We describe our design for multicast/broadcast for-
warding that adheres to the three requirements for SDNsec
(update consistency, path enforcement, and path vali-
dation). For simplicity, we refer to multicast/broadcast
forwarding as multicast.
A strawman’s solution for multicast is to leverage
unicast forwarding: the ingress switch replicates each
packet of a multicast group and uses the unicast for-
warding mechanism to send it to every egress switch
that is on the path of a receiving host. This approach
comes with two benefits: all three requirements are sat-
isfied; and the unicast forwarding mechanism can be
used without modifications. However, this solution is
inefficient with respect to bandwidth overhead.
An alternative approach to implement multicast is
to encode the multicast tree in the packet. Bloom fil-
ters can be used to efficiently encode the links of the
tree [22]. For each link, the switch checks if the bloom
filter returns a positive answer and forwards the packet
along the corresponding links. However, the false posi-
tives of Bloom filters become a limitation: loops can be
formed; and more importantly, forwarding a packet to
an incorrect switch violates network isolation.
We thus adopt a stateful multicast distribution tree
to forward multicast traffic. To implement forwarding
along the specified tree, the forwarding decisions are
stored in forwarding tables at switches. A multicast tree
is represented by a two-tuple: an integer that identifies
the tree (TreeID) and an expiration time (ExpTime)
that indicates when the tree becomes invalid.
The controller computes a multicast tree and assigns
it a unique TreeID. Then, it sends to each switch on the
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Figure 5: SDNsec packet header for multicast traffic.
tree the two-tuple and the list of egress interfaces. Upon
receiving a multicast packet, the ingress switch deter-
mines the correct multicast tree (based on the packet’s
information) and inserts the TreeID, ExpTime, and a se-
quence number (SeqNo) in the packet (Figure 5). Each
core switch that receives a multicast packet, looks up
the forwarding information based on the TreeID in the
packet and forwards it according to the list of specified
interfaces.
The main challenge with this stateful approach is pol-
icy consistency, i.e., ensuring that a packet is not for-
warded by two different versions of a multicast tree.
To this end, we require that a tree is never updated,
instead a new tree is created. However, this alone is
not sufficient to guarantee drop freedom: if the ingress
switch forwards packets of a newly created tree while
core switches are being updated, then the packets with
the new TreeID may get dropped by core switches.
To solve the problem, we add a safe-guard when switches
are updated with a new multicast tree: an ingress switch
is not allowed to use the new tree, i.e., insert the TreeID
into incoming packets, until all other switches on the
tree (core and egress switches) have been updated with
the new tree information. Ingress switches can use the
new tree only after an explicit notification by the con-
troller.
Path enforcement is implemented implicitly, since only
switches on the multicast tree learn the two-tuple infor-
mation of the tree; packets with unknown TreeIDs are
dropped. Hence, if a malicious switch incorrectly for-
wards a packet to an incorrect next-hop switch, then the
switch will drop the packet. Tampering with the TreeID
in the packet is detected through path validation.
The path validation information for multicast is simi-
lar to unicast forwarding. Each switch on the tree com-
putes a MAC for the PVF using its shared key with
the controller. The only difference is that the TreeID,
instead of the FlowID, becomes an input to the MAC
(Equation ??).
C = TreeID || SeqNo (4)
4.4 Monitoring
Network monitoring is an essential tool for traffic en-
gineering and security auditing. For instance, network
operators can steer traffic away from traffic hot spots
or identify switches that drop packets.
In SDNsec, monitoring is performed at the granular-
ity of a flow, similar to OpenFlow. Switches maintain
a monitoring table that stores packet counters for the
flows that they serve. Specifically, ingress switches have
flow tables to look up the FEs, hence, an additional field
is required for packet counters. Core switches need an
additional data structure to accommodate flow statis-
tics.
Designing monitoring for the core network is based
on two principles. First, to prevent state exhaustion at-
tacks the controller instructs switches explicitly which
flows they should monitor. Since switches do not mon-
itor all flows, an attacker cannot generate flows ran-
domly to exhaust the monitoring table. Second, to min-
imize the impact of monitoring on forwarding perfor-
mance, we use an exact match lookup table: the FlowID
in the packet header serves as the key to the entry.
Avoiding more heavyweight lookups (e.g., longest prefix
matching) that require multiple memory accesses and
often linear search operations (e.g., flow-table lookups
in software switches) mitigates attacks that target the
computational complexity of the lookup procedure.
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We start by justifying our design choice of short MACs,
and then we describe how SDNsec protects from the at-
tacks described in Section 2.1.
5.1 On the length of MACs
The path enforcement and path validation mecha-
nisms require MAC computations and verifications at
every switch. We argue that the length of the MACs –
7 bytes for FEs and 8 bytes for the PVF – is sufficient
to provide the security guarantees we seek.
The main idea is that the secret keys used by other
switches are not known to the attacker, which means
that an attacker can at best randomly generate MACs
without a way to check their validity. Consequently,
the attacker would have to inject an immense amount
of traffic even for a single valid FE (256 attempts are re-
quired). Furthermore, to forge FEs for n hops requires
256·n attempts, which becomes computationally infea-
sible even for n = 2. Hence, such traffic injection with
incorrect MACs is easily detectable.
5.2 Path Deviation Attacks
Path deviation attacks – in which packets follow a
path not authorized by the controller – can take differ-
ent forms, as described in Section 2.1.
The security properties of chained MACs with respect
to path validation have been formalized and verified for
a decentralized setting [23]. The centralized control in
SDN simplifies key management, since the controller
sets up the shared symmetric keys with the switches; so-
phisticated key-establishment protocols are not needed.
However, an important difference is that we consider
the ingress and egress switch – not the hosts – as the
source and destination, respectively. In Section 7, we
discuss the security implications of this decision.
Path enforcement is the first line of defense against
path deviation attacks. It prevents path forging and
path detours from a malicious switch that generates
forged FEs. The next benign switch on the path will
drop the packet due to a MAC verification failure. How-
ever, a more sophisticated attacker can replay forward-
ing information of other paths that it is part of, but
which are not authorized for the diverted flow.
Path validation is the second line of defense against
path deviation attacks. Since each switch is inscribing a
MAC value in the packet, the packet carries information
about the presence or absence of switches on the path.
The controller can reactively inspect this information
and obtain a guarantee about the traversed switches
and their order. SDNsec provides this guarantee be-
cause the attacker does not possess the secret keys of
other switches. Note that path validation also catches
attacks from malicious ingress switches that embed in
the packets FEs of other flows. The controller knows
the forwarding information for every flow (based on the
flow tuple) and can detect the misbehavior. Changing
the information that defines a flow would break com-
munication between the end hosts; Section 7 discusses
such cases in more detail.
Furthermore, sequence numbers are used to prevent
replay of the path validation information. A malicious
switch could replace the PVF value in a packet with
a value from a previously seen packet, obfuscating the
actual path taken by the packet to avoid being detected
by the controller. The replay is detected through a high
repetition frequency of certain sequence numbers; under
normal operation each sequence number would appear
at most a few times (Section 4.1).
The path enforcement and validation properties of
SDNsec can be compromised in the case of multiple ad-
jacent malicious switches. For example, if a malicious
on-path switch has multiple malicious adjacent switches
(not on the path), then the packets can be forwarded
along the malicious path segment and back. The on-
path malicious switch can then reinject the packets along
the initial intended path; this attack cannot be de-
tected, as pointed out by prior work [23].
5.3 Denial-of-Service
Network devices typically store state (e.g., forwarding
tables) on fast memory (e.g., SRAM), which is a lim-
ited resource. This becomes the target of attackers by
populating the memory with bogus data that replaces
legitimate information.
In SDNsec, the state exhaustion attack vector is con-
fined to the edge of the network. Only edge switches
keep forwarding tables and thus they are susceptible to
a state exhaustion attack by malicious hosts that orig-
inate bogus flows. Core switches keep forwarding state
only for broadcast/multicast traffic, but these entries
are preconfigured by the controller with the valid tree
IDs and, thus, cannot be populated with bogus entries.
In Section 6.3.2, we compare the performance between
an edge switch and a core switch under a state exhaus-
tion attack.
Furthermore, each switch keeps state to monitor for-
warded traffic at the granularity of flows. An attacker
could generate random flow IDs in order to exhaust the
monitoring table. This resource is protected by having
the switches monitor only flow IDs that the controller
mandates. Thus, the controller can securely adapt the
resources according to the device’s capabilities.
6. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUA-
TION
We implement the SDNsec data-plane functionality
on a software switch, and evaluate performance on a
commodity server machine. Furthermore, we analyze
the path validation and bandwidth overhead for the net-
work.
6.1 Software Switch Prototype
To achieve high performance, our implementation lever-
ages the Data Plane Development Kit (DPDK) [24] and
the Intel AES-NI instruction set [25]. DPDK is an open-
source set of libraries and drivers for packet processing
in user space. DPDK comes with zero-copy Network
Interface Card (NIC) drivers that leverage polling to
avoid unnecessary interrupts. Intel AES-NI is an in-
struction set that uses hardware cryptographic engines
built into the CPU to speed up the AES block cipher.
To compute and verify the required MACs, we use the
Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC-MAC) with AES as
the block cipher. The input lengths to the MACs for a
FE and PVF are 15 and 14 bytes respectively. Note that
for both cases the input fits in one AES block (16 bytes)
and that the input length is fixed and independent of the
path length5. Furthermore, we use 128-bit encryption
keys and truncate the output to the required number of
bits (Section 4.1).
Furthermore, we optimize forwarding in the following
ways. First, we store four FEs in different xmm registers
(xmm0-xmm3) and issue four encryption instructions with
the preloaded round key (stored in xmm4). Since each
AES engine can simultaneously perform 4 AES opera-
tions, a switch can process four packets in parallel on
each CPU core. The assembly code snippet is given
below:
aesenc xmm0,xmm4 //Round 1 for Packet 1
aesenc xmm1,xmm4 //Round 1 for Packet 2
aesenc xmm2,xmm4 //Round 1 for Packet 3
5CBC-MAC is vulnerable when used for variable-length
messages
aesenc xmm3,xmm4 //Round 1 for Packet 4
Second, a dedicated CPU core is assigned to a NIC
port and handles all the required packet processing for
the port. Each physical core has a dedicated AES-NI
engine and thus packets received on one port are served
from the AES-NI engine of the physical core assigned
to that port.
Third, we create per-core data structures to avoid
unnecessary cache misses. Each NIC is linked with a
receive queue and a transmit queue, and these queues
are assigned to a CPU core to handle the NIC’s traf-
fic. Furthermore, we load balance traffic from one NIC
over multiple cores, depending on the system’s hard-
ware. For this purpose, we leverage Receiver Side Scal-
ing (RSS) [26] as follows: each NIC is assigned multiple
queues, and each queue can be handled by another core.
RSS is then used to distribute traffic among the queues
of a NIC.
Our implementation of the edge switch is based on the
DPDK vSwitch [27]. The DPDK vSwitch is a fork of
the open source vSwitch [28] running on DPDK for bet-
ter performance. Open vSwitch is a multilayer switch
that is used to build programmable networks and can
run within a hypervisor or as a standalone control stack
for switching devices. Edge switches in SDNsec use
the typical flow matching rules and forwarding tables
to forward a packet and therefore we chose to augment
an existing production quality solution. We augment
the lookup table to store forwarding information for a
flow in addition to the output port. The ingress switch
increases the size of the packet header and inputs the
additional information (FEs, sequence number, and its
PVF).
We implement core switches from scratch due to the
minimal functionality they perform. A core switch per-
forms two MAC computations (it verifies its FE and
computes its PVF value), updates the flow’s counters
(if the flow is monitored), and forwards the packet from
the specified port.
6.2 Packet Overhead
The security properties of SDNsec come at the cost
of increased packet size. For each packet, the ingress
switch creates an additional packet header with its size
depending on the path length: 8 bytes/switch (includ-
ing the egress switch) and a constant amount of 22
bytes/packet.
To put the packet overhead into context, we analyze
two deployment scenarios for SDNsec: a data-center
deployment and a research network deployment. Fur-
thermore, to evaluate the worst case for SDNsec, we
consider the diameter of the network topologies, i.e.,
the longest shortest path between any two nodes in the
network. We also evaluate the packet overhead for the
average path length in the research-network case.
For the data-center case, we consider two common
data center topologies: a leaf-spine topology [29] and a
3-tier topology (access, aggregation, and core layer) [30].
The diameter for the leaf-spine topology is 4 links (i.e.,
3 switches) and for the 3-tier topology 6 links (i.e., 5
switches)6. In addition, to relate the overhead to realis-
tic data center traffic, we use the findings of two studies:
the average packet size in data centers is 850 bytes [20],
and packet sizes are concentrated around the values of
200 and 1400 bytes [21]. Table 1 shows the overhead
for the different topologies and path lengths.
For the research network deployment, we analyze the
topology of the Internet2 network [31], which is publicly
available [32]; we consider only the 17 L3 and 34 L2
devices in the topology – not the L1 optical repeaters
– and find a diameter of 11 links (i.e., 10 switches).
Furthermore, for the Internet2 topology we calculate an
average path length of 6.62 links (i.e., 6 switches). To
relate the overhead to actual traffic, we analyze three 1-
hour packet traces from CAIDA [33] and calculate the
respective packet overhead for the mean and median
packet lengths. (Table 2).
Our results indicate a moderate packet overhead for
the average path length in Internet2 and a considerable
packet overhead for the worst case (high path lengths)
in both deployment scenarios. This analysis provides
an insight about the price of security and robustness
for policy enforcement and validation of the SDN data
plane. Furthermore, we observe that the packet over-
head is more significant for ISP topologies because they
have typically longer paths than data center networks:
data center networks are optimized with respect to la-
tency and cabling length leading to shorter path lengths.
Novel data center topologies demonstrate even shorter
path lengths compared to the more common topologies
we analyzed [34]. This path-length optimization leads
to a lower packet overhead for a data center deployment
of SDNsec.
6.3 Performance Evaluation
We compare the forwarding performance of edge and
core switches with the DPDK vSwitch under two sce-
narios: normal operation and a state exhaustion attack.
We run the SDNsec software switch on a commodity
server machine. The server has a non-uniform mem-
ory access (NUMA) design with two Intel Xeon E5-
2680 CPUs that communicate over two QPI links. Each
NUMA node is equipped with four banks of 16 GB DD3
RAM. Furthermore, the server has 2 dual-port 10 GbE
6Our reported path lengths include the links between
the hosts and the switches.
Packet Size
200 B 850 B 1400 B
Leaf-Spine 19.0% 4.5% 2.7%
3-Tier 27.0% 6.4% 3.9%
Table 1: Packet overhead for data center traffic patterns
and topologies.
Trace 1 Trace 2 Trace 3
747 B 463 B 906 B 1420 B 691 B 262 B
A 8.3% 13.4% 6.8% 4.4% 9.0% 23.7%
D 12.6% 20.3% 10.4% 6.6% 14.0% 35.9%
Table 2: Packet overhead for the average path length
(A) and the diameter (D) of the Internet2 topology and
the mean and median packet sizes from 3 CAIDA 1-hour
packet traces.
NICs (PCIe Gen2x8) providing a unidirectional capac-
ity of 40 Gbps.
We utilize Spirent SPT-N4U-220 to generate traffic.
We specify IPv4 as the network-layer protocol, and we
vary Ethernet packet sizes from 128 to 1500 bytes.7 For
a given link capacity, the packet size determines the
packet rate and hence the load on the switch. For ex-
ample, for 128-byte packets and one 10 GbE link, the
maximum packet rate is 8.45 Million packets per second
(Mpps); for all 8 NIC ports it is 67.6 Mpps. These val-
ues are the physical limits and represent the theoretical
peak throughput.
Furthermore, for the SDNsec edge switch and the
DPDK vSwitch, we populate a flow table with 64k en-
tries; for the SDNsec edge switch, the flow table holds
forwarding entries for a path with 5 switches. Flows
are defined based on the destination MAC address – all
other fields remain constant.
6.3.1 Normal Operation
For normal operation, we generate packets with a
destination MAC address in the range of the addresses
stored in the flow table of the switch. Figure 6b shows
the average latency per packet, and Figure 6a shows the
switching performance for a 60-second measurement in-
terval.
The ingress switch demonstrates a higher latency com-
pared to DPDK vSwitch because the SDNsec header
must be added to every packet: the packet size increases
and the longer entries in the lookup table cause addi-
tional cache misses that increase latency. Furthermore,
the latency of the core switch is the same as the DPDK
baseline latency, demonstrating the minimal processing
overhead at the core switches.
We observe a considerable performance decrease for
the ingress switch compared to the DPDK vSwitch.
This decrease is a side-effect of the packet overhead
(Section 6.2): the outgoing traffic volume of an ingress
switch is higher than the incoming volume. Thus, when
the incoming links are fully utilized, packets get dropped
and the throughput is lower (assuming that the aggre-
gate ingress and egress capacity of the switch is the
same). This comparison captures the effect of packet
7We exclude 64-byte packets because the minimum
packet size in the core of the network is higher because
the additional information in SDNsec does not fit in the
minimum-sized Ethernet packet.
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Figure 6: Switching performance under normal operation.
overhead and not the processing overhead. In contrast
to the ingress switch, the core switch outperforms the
other switches and achieves the baseline performance
for all packet sizes.
Our experiments under normal operation demonstrate
a performance decrease at the edge of the network, how-
ever, the core of the network can handle significantly
more traffic, compared to today’s SDN realization.
6.3.2 State Exhaustion Attack
To analyze the switching performance of the switch
under a state exhaustion attack, we generate traffic with
random destination MAC addresses. The destination
addresses are randomly drawn from a pool of 232 (∼4
billion) addresses to prevent the switches from perform-
ing any optimization, such as caching flow information.
Figure 7 shows the switching performances.
We observe a considerable decrease (i.e., over 100
times slower than the DPDK baseline) in throughput
for both the DPDK vSwitch and the ingress switch (Fig-
ure 7a). This decrease is due to cache misses when per-
forming flow table lookups–the switches are forced to
perform memory lookups, which are considerably slower
than cache lookups, in order to determine the forward-
ing information to process the incoming packets. The
latency plot in Figure 7b tells a similar story: both the
DPDK vSwitch and the ingress switch take considerably
longer time to process packets.
However, for the core switches the switching perfor-
mance remains unaffected compared to normal opera-
tion. This is because the core switches do not perform
any memory lookup when processing packets.
6.4 Path Validation Overhead
Path validation introduces processing overhead for
the controller and bandwidth overhead for the network.
The controller has to recompute the PVFs for the re-
ported packets, and the egress switches have to report
the PVFs in the packet headers to the controller.
We estimate the overheads based on information for
large data centers: 80k hosts [35] with 10G access links
that are utilized at 1% (in each direction) [36] and send
average-sized packets of 850 bytes [?]. Due to lack of
knowledge for traffic patterns, we consider the worst
case: all traffic is inter-rack and the path consists of
5 switches (worst-case path length for 3-tier data cen-
ter); also, all egress switches report all the packet head-
ers. Overall, the aggregate packet rate for this setup is
1176 Mpps.
We implement the PVC, which reads the packet head-
ers, fetches the corresponding shared keys with the switches,
and recomputes the PVFs. For the previous setup, an
8 core CPU can validate 17 Mpps. For the whole data-
center traffic (1176 Mpps), 69 CPUs would be required.
For the bandwidth overhead, the data size to vali-
date one packet is 14 bytes (3 bytes for the FlowID, 3
bytes for the SeqNo, and 8 bytes for the PVF). For the
previous setup, we estimate the bandwidth overhead at
115 Gbps, which accounts for 1.6% of the whole data-
center traffic.
7. DISCUSSION
One attack we have not considered is packet drop-
ping by a malicious switch. Flow statistics through
monitoring provide a basic defense perimeter for such
attacks. The controller can instruct switches to period-
ically report packet counters for certain flows and then
inspect if packets are dropped at a certain link. Fur-
thermore, dishonest reports would result in inconsistent
reports that pinpoint the misbehavior to a certain link
between two switches (it is not possible to identify the
exact switch) [37]. However, packet dropping from a
malicious ingress or egress switch cannot be detected
through monitoring. This is the side-effect of a design
decision in SDNsec.
We have made the deliberate design decision that the
network stack of the host should not be modified. This
design choice provides a smoother incremental deploy-
ment path for SDNsec, since hosts do not perform any
additional functionality. This can be beneficial also for
a data-center deployment, when tenants have control
over their operating system (e.g., in the Infrastructure-
as-a-Service model).
This design decision, however, has implications for
the security properties of SDNsec and enables certain
attacks. For example, a malicious egress switch can
transfer packets out of an incorrect interface, replay
packets, or drop packets; without feedback from the
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Figure 7: Switching performance under state exhaustion attack.
end host it is not possible to detect such attacks. Fur-
thermore, a malicious ingress switch can replay packets
without being detected, since the ingress switch can in-
scribe different sequence numbers; again, the transport
layer of the destination host – and not the network –
can detect the replay.
8. RELATED WORK
We briefly describe recent research proposals that are
related to data-plane security and state reduction in
SDN.
Data-plane security. There are only a few proposals
accounting for compromised switches at the data plane.
The most closely related work to ours is SANE [12]:
the controller hands out capabilities to end hosts – not
to switches, as in SDNsec – in order to enforce net-
work paths. This approach requires modification of end
hosts in order to perform additional tasks. Namely, ev-
ery host must communicate with the controller in order
to establish a shared symmetric key and obtain capa-
bilities. Failure recovery is pushed to the host, which
has to detect the failure and then explicitly ask the con-
troller for a new path. In addition, SANE cannot pro-
vide protection against stronger adversaries that collude
and perform a wormhole attack: a malicious switch can
replay capabilities by prepending them to the existing
forwarding information in the packet and thus can di-
verge traffic over another path; a colluding switch re-
moves the prepended capabilities and forwards packets
to a downstream switch of the original path. SDNsec
provides path validation to deal with such attacks. Fi-
naly, SANE does not consider broadcast/multicast for-
warding.
Jacquin et al. [38] take another approach, using trusted
computing to attest remotely that network elements use
an approved software version. Being a first step in this
direction, there are unaddressed challenges with respect
to scalability: processing overhead (overall attestation
time), bandwidth overhead (extra traffic due to attes-
tation), and management overhead (the number of dif-
ferent software versions deployed).
OPT [39] provides path validation on top of a dy-
namic key-establishment protocol that enables routers
to re-create symmetric keys with end hosts. In SDNsec,
key management is simplified, since each router shares
a key only with the controller. Thus, we do not involve
the host in any key establishment and avoid the over-
head of key establishment in the presented protocols.
ICING [40] is another path validation protocol that
leverages cryptographic information in the packets. Each
router on the path verifies cryptographic markings in
the packet that were inserted by the source and each
upstream router. ICING comes with a high bandwidth
overhead due to large packet sizes, demonstrating a
23.3% average packet overhead. Furthermore, ICING
requires pairwise symmetric keys between all entities
on a path.
State reduction for SDN. Another class of propos-
als focuses on state reduction for the SDN data plane.
Source routing is a commonly used approach to realize
this goal, and recent work shows that source routing not
only decreases the forwarding table size, but provides a
higher and more flexible resource utiliziation [41]. In
SourceFlow [42], packets carry pointers to action lists
for every core switch on the path. Hence, core switches
only store action tables that encode potential actions
for packets and are indexed by a pointer in the packet.
Segment Routing [43] is based on source routing and
combines the benefits of MPLS [44] with the central-
ized control of SDN. An ingress switch adds an ordered
list of instructions into the packet header, and each sub-
sequent switch inspects such an instruction. These ap-
proaches are similar to SDNsec in that they reduce state
at core switches by embedding information in packet
headers. However, the use of source routing without
corresponding security mechanisms opens a bigger at-
tack vector compared to legacy hop-by-hop routing: a
single compromised switch can modify the forwarding
information and steer a packet over a non-compliant
path.
9. CONCLUSION
Security in SDN remains a neglected issue and could
raise deployment hurdles for security concerned envi-
ronments. We have presented a security extension to
achieve forwarding accountability for the SDN data plane,
i.e., to ensure that the operator’s policies are correctly
applied to the data plane. To this end, we have de-
signed two mechanisms: path enforcement to ensure
that the switches forward the packets based on the in-
structions of the operator and path validation to allow
the operator to reactively verify that the data plane
has followed the specified policies. In addition, SDNsec
guarantees consistent policy updates such that the be-
havior of the data plane is well defined during recon-
figurations. Lastly, minimizing the amount of state at
the core switches confines state exhaustion attacks to
the network edge. We hope that this work assists in
moving towards more secure SDN deployments.
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